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Abstract 
In D & Others v East Berkshire Community Health & Others and JD (FC) v 
East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust & Others the English judiciary 
held that children wrongly diagnosed as having been abused or mistakenly 
taken into care can now sue the social workers responsible. Lord Phillips 
ruled that the House of Lords ruling in 1995 which barred claims against 
social workers in child abuse cases could not survive the Human Rights Act 
1998. In this article I will examine the development of the law in this area and 
the implications of this recent landmark decision for children who have 
suffered as a result of local authority negligence and their parents. 
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Children’s right to sue for social workers negligence: the impact of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 
 
 
Introduction 
In D & Others v East Berkshire Community Health & Others [2003] EWCA 
Civ 1151; [2003] All ER (D) 547 (Jul) the English Court of Appeal lifted the 
established immunity enjoyed by health and social work professionals in child abuse 
cases. Lord Phillips held that it was no longer legitimate to rule that there was no duty 
of care owed to a child over child abuse investigations or care proceedings. The court 
ruled that the Human Rights Act 1998 superseded the previous House of Lords ruling 
in X (A Minor) v Bedfordshire County Council and Others [1995] 2 AC 633, [1995] 3 
All ER 353 (HL), which barred claims against social workers in child abuse cases. 
Therefore children wrongly diagnosed as abused or mistakenly taken into care can 
now sue the social workers responsible. This decision was approved by the House of 
Lords in JD (FC) v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust and others [2005] 
UKHL 23 in which the House of Lords confirmed that while child care professionals 
may owe a duty of care to children, no such duty was owed to parents suspected of 
abuse.  
D & Others v East Berkshire Community Health & Others and JD (FC) v East 
Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust and others represent a profound change in 
the right of children to seek redress where social workers‟ have been negligent in 
respect of their child protection duties. This article will examine whether English 
children can now hold local authorities accountable where the authority has failed to 
adequately discharge their child protection duties and consequently caused harm or 
suffering to children. I will examine how the Human Rights Act 1998, and the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, has impacted upon the 
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development of children‟s rights in this area from X v Bedfordshire County Council to 
D & Others v East Berkshire Community Health & Others. I will assess the effect of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 in restricting social workers‟ immunity; and I will 
consider the impact of D & Others v East Berkshire Community Health & Others and 
JD (FC) v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust and others for children, and 
their parents, who have been harmed by social workers negligence.  
 
Liability of local authorities: X (A Minor) v Bedfordshire County Council 
The House of Lords in X (A Minor) v Bedfordshire County Council and 
Others [1995] 2 AC 633, [1995] 3 All ER 353 (HL) clarified the scope of the private 
law remedy of an action for damages for breach of duty in the context of alleged 
failures by a local authority in connection with their child protection duties. This case 
concerned a local authority which failed to take appropriate action to protect the five 
child plaintiff‟s against parental neglect and the risk of abuse. The local authority had 
received reports from relatives, neighbours, the police, the family‟s general 
practitioner, a head teacher, the NSPCC, a social worker and a health visitor that if the 
plaintiff children continued living with their parents they would be at risk of abuse, 
including sexual abuse, that their living conditions were appalling and that the 
children were hungry and dirty. Despite these reports the defendant local authority 
took little or no action with regard to the children from 1987 until 1992, when it 
finally decided to seek care orders in respect of them. In 1993 the children brought an 
action against the local authority claiming damages for breach of statutory duty and 
negligence. They claimed that the authority had failed to have regard to their welfare 
and that its failure to do so had caused them to suffer ill-treatment, illness, impairment 
of their health and poor development.  
 3 
Bedfordshire County Council conceded that there was a relationship of 
proximity between themselves and the plaintiffs, and that the damage suffered by the 
plaintiffs was foreseeable. Nevertheless the House of Lords held that public policy 
considerations negated the imposition of a duty of care. Lord Browne Wilkinson 
identified five such considerations,
1
 namely:  
a) the interdisciplinary nature of the child protection system and the consequent 
difficulties of allocating responsibility between agencies; 
b) the delicacy of the authority’s task in dealing with children at risk; 
c) the risk of local authority’s adopting a cautious and defensive attitude 
through fear of liability; 
d) potential conflict between parents and social workers could generate ill-
feeling and litigation; 
e) the existence of alternative remedies. 
 
Lord Browne Wilkinson considered that professional standards are likely to suffer in 
the face of potential litigation. Fear of litigation could lead those fulfilling the duties 
imposed by the relevant legislation to discharge their obligations in a detrimentally 
defensive frame of mind, consequently the local authority might put children at risk 
by making extended inquiries to obtain concrete facts. The House of Lords also found 
that the duty imposed upon the local authority in relation to the welfare of children 
was so general and unspecific that it conferred a wide scope to exercise subjective 
judgment. Lord Browne Wilkinson insisted that where a public authority enjoyed such 
a statutory discretion it was for that body and not the courts to exercise the discretion. 
Therefore nothing which the body did within the ambit of its discretion could give rise 
to an action at common law. The plaintiffs, in seeking to show that the authority acted 
outside its discretion, would have to prove that it acted manifestly unreasonably so 
that its actions fell entirely outside the ambit of statutory discretion.
2
 Their Lordships 
therefore concluded that a child has no cause of action for harm arising from: (a) an 
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alleged failure of a local authority to comply with its statutory duties under children‟s 
welfare legislation; (b) careless performance of a statutory duty by an authority; (c) 
negligence in respect of alleged failure; and (d) actions or decisions where a common 
law duty of care might arise, if they came within the ambit of a statutory discretion.  
It is clear from the majority judgment given by Lord Hoffmann in Stovin v 
Wise [1996] 3 All ER 801 that the courts in England and Wales were inherently very 
reluctant to impose a duty of care on a public body in the context of a claim 
concerning failure to exercise a statutory power. Lord Hoffmann expressed the view 
that the fact that Parliament has conferred a discretion must be some indication that 
the policy of the Act in question was not to create a right to compensation. Two 
minimum conditions for basing a duty of care on the exercise of a statutory power in 
respect of an omission to exercise the power, were laid down: (1) it must have been 
irrational for the authority not to have exercised the power, so that there was in effect 
a public law duty to act; and (2) there must be exceptional grounds for holding that 
the policy of the statute conferred the right to compensation on those who suffered 
loss if the power was not exercised. The doctrine of general reliance developed in the 
Australian High Court by Mason J in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 
CLR 424
3
 was accepted in limited circumstances by Lord Hoffmann. This doctrine, as 
propounded by Mason J, is based on the idea that the legislature may well have 
conferred powers on a public body in relation to matters which were of such 
complexity or magnitude that individuals could not be expected to take adequate steps 
for their own protection. Such a situation generates a general expectation on the part 
of the individual that the power would be exercised, and a realisation on the part of 
the public authority that there would be general reliance on the exercise of that power. 
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Lord Hoffmann held, in Stovin, that it was essential to this doctrine that the benefit or 
service provided under statutory powers should be of a uniform and routine nature, so 
that one could describe exactly what the pubic authority was supposed to do.
4
 Thus if 
a service was provided as routine, it would be irrational for a public authority to 
provide it in one case and arbitrarily withhold it in another.  
These cases underline the aversion of the judiciary in England and Wales to 
imposing liability on public authorities. X v Bedfordshire clearly established that a 
decision by a local authority whether or not to take a child into care, with all the 
difficult aspects that such a decision involves and all the disruptions which may come 
about, is not a decision which the courts will review by way of a claim for damages in 
negligence, though there may be other public law remedies such as judicial review. In 
X v Bedfordshire the House of Lords also confirmed that an action for vicarious 
liability would be „inappropriate‟ as it could adversely affect the local authority, and 
social workers in the employment of the local authority. This view was also 
unequivocally expressed in M v Newham London Borough Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 
[1995] 3 All ER 353, HL, in which the House of Lords refused to impose a common 
law duty of care upon the local authority for the alleged negligence of its servants. In 
Newham the child, who had been sexually abused, was unnecessarily removed from 
her mother‟s care because a psychiatrist and social worker failed to take an accurate 
case history from the child‟s mother. The child and the mother alleged that the 
defendant‟s failed to investigate the facts with proper care and thoroughness or to 
discuss them with the mother and in so doing were in breach of their duty to safeguard 
the welfare of the child. The House of Lords held that the local authority was not 
vicariously liable for the actions of the social workers and psychiatrists whom it 
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instructed. Since the function of social workers and psychiatrists was to advise the 
authority rather than the children, they did not assume any general professional duty 
of care towards the children. Moreover the investigations carried out by the 
psychiatrist had an immediate link with possible care proceedings brought in 
pursuance of a statutory duty, and accordingly the psychiatrist was entitled to the 
immunity from suit accorded to witnesses and potential witnesses.
5
 These cases mark 
a decisive rejection of the use of vicarious liability to question a local authority‟s 
decision in the child care field.  
The House of Lords judgments in X v Bedfordshire County Council and M v 
Newham London Borough Council were influential judgments which resonated with 
judiciaries around the world. In particular, the House of Lords judgments influenced 
the Australian judiciary in the cases of Hillman v Black (1996) 67 SASR 490 and 
Sullivan v Moody [2002] HCA. In both these cases the social workers, and medical 
practitioners, were alleged to have acted negligently in examining the appellants‟ 
children and investigating the possibility of sexual abuse. No criminal charges were 
laid against the appellants, but the allegations of sexual abuse resulted in the 
breakdown of the appellants‟ marriages. In Hillman v Black, Matheson J in the 
Supreme Court of South Australia was strongly influenced by the decision of the 
House of Lords in X v Bedfordshire County Council. Matheson J believed that if 
liability in damages were imposed local authorities would adopt a more cautious and 
defensive approach to their duties (at p750). Likewise in Sullivan v Moody Doyle CJ 
in the High Court of Australia was strongly influenced by the reasoning of Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson in X v Bedfordshire County Council. The jurisprudence of the 
United States is also adverse to the imposition of liability on public authorities. The 
                                                 
5
 per Evans v London Medical College [1981] 1 All ER 715  
 7 
Federal Constitution of the United States does not place an affirmative obligation on 
the government to protect or provide for children, although a number of state 
constitutions place affirmative burdens on states to provide for indigent citizens. The 
position of the Federal Constitution was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme 
Court in the tragic case of 4 year old Joshua De Shaney, who was brutally beaten by 
his father.
6
 Joshua DeShaney and his mother brought a claim against social workers 
and other officials who failed to protect Joshua, despite suspecting that Joshua‟s 
father was abusing him. In dismissing the action the Supreme Court explained that the 
Constitution is: 
“phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain 
minimal levels of safety and security … Its purpose was to protect the people from 
the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other.”7 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that no constitutional right is infringed when a state 
fails to protect a child from harm inflicted by a private citizen. More recently in S.S. 
ex rel. Jervis v McMullen (225F. 3d 960 (8
th
 Circuit 2000)(en banc) cert. Denied, 121 
S. Ct. 1227 (2001)) the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit applied 
DeShaney and thus confirmed the Federal Court‟s steadfast determination not to 
recognise torts brought by aggrieved children. The McMullen court noted the public 
policy mandating that children remain with, or be returned to, their natural parents, if 
to do so is in the best interest of the child. The court recognised that the conflict 
between this policy and the inherent charge of such agencies to combat the scourge of 
child abuse too often presents underpaid and overworked case workers with an 
impossible choice. It would therefore wreak havoc on a troubled child welfare system 
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to declare open season on its employees by reducing the standard for incurring 
liability for mistakes in judgment.
8
 
In summary, the case law examined thus far has accorded tortious liability 
little scope and effectively grants local authorities an immunity from suit. 
Carelessness in investigating abuse or imprudent decisions about whether or not to 
take a child into care are not issues which the courts will review by way of a claim for 
damages in negligence or vicarious liability. Therefore for children who have suffered 
harm as a result of a local authority‟s negligence the only legal remedy available is by 
way of judicial review or through extra-judicial routes such as the Ombudsman. 
However a number of relevant decisions have been given since Bedfordshire, 
including several House of Lords decisions. In none of these do the courts explicitly 
depart from the Bedfordshire decision. Nevertheless it is always possible for the 
House of Lords to reduce the impact of a previous decision by distinguishing it or 
confining it narrowly to its particular facts, and it is therefore necessary to consider 
whether this has occurred in relation to child abuse cases. In the next section I will 
examine how the steadfast refusal by the judiciary to hold statutory child welfare 
agencies accountable for negligence, or vicarious liability, in the performance of their 
child protection functions has been eroded. 
 
Erosion of Local Authority Immunity 
The House of Lords decision of Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council 
[2000] All ER (D) 1076, has far reaching implications for those concerned with the 
care of children. In Phelps the House of Lords found a local authority vicariously 
liable for the failure of an educational psychologist to diagnose a child‟s dyslexia. The 
Court of Appeal had previously dismissed the claimant‟s action in Phelps [1999] 1 
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All ER 421 on the grounds that an educational psychologist who assessed a child 
pursuant to the local authority‟s statutory obligations under the various Education 
Acts, did not assume responsibility to that child in tort. The Court of Appeal believed 
that in the absence of such an assumption of personal responsibility, it was not fair, 
just or reasonable that a duty of care should be imposed, given the difficulties in 
proving causation in such cases, the inevitable drain on scarce resources which would 
result from the imposition of such liability, the multi-disciplinary nature of the 
education process and the existence of a detailed statutory appeals system; almost the 
same grounds outlined by the House of Lords in X v Bedfordshire County Council. 
The House of Lords in Phelps disagreed with this view and held that where an 
educational psychologist is specifically called in to advise in relation to the 
assessment and future provision for a specific child, and it is clear that the parents 
acting for the child and the teachers will follow that advice, prima facie a duty of care 
arises. Lord Nicholls held that the duty to the pupil would march hand in hand with 
the professional‟s responsibilities to his own employer, he should exercise reasonable 
skill and care when assessing the child and advising the local authority. If he fails to 
do so, the local authority as his employer will be vicariously liable to the child for the 
negligent acts or omissions of the psychologist committed in the course of his 
employment. Lord Nicholls described this type of case as “an example par excellence 
of a situation where the law will regard the professional as owing a duty of care to a 
third party as well as his own employer.”9  
In reaching this conclusion their Lordships rejected in a robust manner the 
policy concerns which underlined the Court of Appeal‟s judgment.10 For instance, 
Lord Clyde took the view that the practical problems posed by the multi-disciplinary 
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context could not create a legal barrier to claims. Lord Clyde argued that the mere fact 
that there may be practical difficulties should not thwart otherwise deserving cases as 
justice should not be denied on the ground that a claim is of a complex nature.
11
 Lords 
Clyde and Nicholls also asserted their belief that imposing a duty of care could 
conceivably have the healthy effect of ensuring that high standards are sought and 
secured.
12
 It has long been a fear of the courts that by recognising new duties of care, 
a flood of unfounded claims would thereby be unleashed.
13
 Lord Nicholls rejected this 
in broad fashion: “denial of the existence of a cause of action is seldom, if ever, the 
appropriate response to fear of its abuse.”14 The House of Lords reassured that any 
fear of a flood of claims may be countered by the consideration that in order to get off 
the ground the claimant must be able to demonstrate that the standard of care fell 
short of that set by the Bolam v Friern [1957] 2 All ER 118 test. In Bolam it was held 
that:  
“A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice 
accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular 
art… ” 
 
This deliberately high standard is a recognition of the difficult nature of some 
decisions which those to whom the test applies are required to make, and accordingly 
provides room for genuine differences of view on the propriety of one course of 
action as against another. Hence social workers will continue to exercise a significant 
measure of discretion in the course of their child care related work. They can only be 
held liable where they have reached a decision that no responsible body of social 
workers would endorse.  
                                                 
11
 at 673 
12
 at 672 
13
 Fairgrieve, D. “Pushing back the boundaries of public authority liability: Tort law enters the 
classroom” (2002) Public Law 288 
14
 at 667, Lord Slynn at 655 
 11 
The House of Lords in Phelps differs from Bedfordshire in that the court in 
Phelps saw no reason in principle why a claim in negligence against a local authority 
should never be possible. In Phelps the House of Lords reviewed and rejected the 
policy reasons, which had previously prevented the imposition of liability. Although 
their Lordships only decided the vicarious liability option, its rejection of the policy 
arguments put forward to bolster vicarious liability makes it difficult to see how the 
Bedfordshire and Stovin policy arguments can be sustained in the context of primary 
liability under common law. Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [1999] 2 FLR 
426, [1997] 3 All ER 171 also represents a discernible swing of the pendulum against 
the over-restrictive position previously applying to negligence claims in child 
protection cases. The plaintiff, by then in his twenties, brought an action in negligence 
against the local authority claiming for personal injury. He had been made the subject 
of a care order when he was a baby and remained in care until his majority. He 
alleged breaches by the authority of its duty to protect him from physical, emotional, 
psychiatric and psychological injury and to promote his development. He complained 
of the authority‟s failure to arrange his adoption, unsatisfactory placements with foster 
parents and in community homes, lack of monitoring and failure to manage his 
reintroduction to relatives. He alleged that if the duties which lay upon the defendants 
had not been breached, he would not, on the balance of probabilities, have left the 
care of the local authority as a young man of 18 years with no family or attachments 
whatsoever, who had developed a psychiatric illness causing him to self harm and 
become involved in criminal activities.
15
 The House of Lords unanimously held that 
the Bedfordshire case did not in the circumstances prevent a claim of negligence 
being brought by a child formerly in its care. Although no completely analogous 
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claim had succeeded, the House of Lords believed that it could incrementally extend 
the pre-existing duties of care.
16
 The question whether it was fair, just and reasonable 
to impose a duty of care was not to be decided in the abstract on the basis of assumed 
hypothetical facts but had to be decided on what was proved.
17
 The plaintiff was 
accordingly entitled to have his claim heard and the facts investigated and not to have 
his case summarily dismissed.  
The House of Lords in Barrett
18
 considered the public policy considerations 
explored in X v Bedfordshire County Council. Whilst not disputing the validity of 
these policy concerns and thus not overruling this case, their Lordships held that they 
did not apply with the same force in Barrett as Bedfordshire had involved the 
sensitive issue of whether or not to take a child into care, in Barrett the plaintiff was 
already in the care of the authority. Essentially there are four salient points to note 
from the decision in Barrett. First, it was accepted that a claim may lie against a local 
authority arising from child-care decisions in certain circumstances. Secondly, the 
court emphasised the general undesirability of striking out claims arising in uncertain 
and developing areas of the law without full exploration of the facts. Thirdly, the 
notion of an exclusionary rule conferring immunity on particular classes of defendant 
was rejected. Lastly, in Barrett it was deemed that the policy factors which had 
weighed with the House of Lords in X v Bedfordshire and M v Newham did not have 
the same weight where complaints related to acts and omissions after a child had been 
taken into care. The risk of local authority‟s adopting a cautious and defensive attitude 
through fear of liability was one of the policy reasons militating against a duty of care 
in the Bedfordshire case. Empirical evidence is seldom given for this defensive 
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practice phenomenon. It is a matter of impression, expressing a hypothesis rather than 
any proven conclusion.
19
 It also assumes, perhaps unfairly, that public sector workers 
will adopt a timid approach to frontline public service provision when faced with 
professional negligence standards, in that it presupposes that those persons subject to 
the legal duty will misread the standard of behaviour that is required of them and react 
in an overly cautious manner. Legal arguments cannot be solved, and litigation cannot 
be determined, on the basis of impressions, hypothesis or hunches, however eminent 
and experienced their source may be. A robust standard of proof of breach would 
thwart tendencies towards defensive practice, this approach has been borne out in 
Barrett, as both Lord Hutton and Lord Slynn upheld Evan LJ‟s contention that: 
“if the conduct in question is of a kind which can be measured against the 
standard of the reasonable man, placed as the defendant was, then I do not see 
why the law in the public interest should not require those standards to be 
observed.”20  
 
Moreover, the existence of a duty of care can play an important role in contributing to 
the maintenance of high standards of public service provision, resulting in fewer 
children wrongly being taken into care and more children rightly being taken into 
care.
21
 This view is shared by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in AG v Prince and 
Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 which explicitly rejected the House of Lords fear in X v 
Bedfordshire that private law duties would lead to defensive social work. The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal believed that a private duty of care would reinforce the role 
of the social worker rather than cut across that role. 
Barrett was followed in S v Gloucestershire County Council, L v Tower 
Hamlets London Borough Council [2000] 1 FLR 828, [2001] Fam 313 CA, [2001] 2 
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WLR 909. In both cases the plaintiffs, now adults, had been in the care of their 
respective local authorities and lived with foster parents. They both alleged that they 
had been sexually abused by their respective foster fathers and brought actions against 
the local authorities claiming damages for personal injury, including psychiatric 
damage, suffered as a result of the negligence and breach of duty of care by the local 
authorities. May LJ accepted the evidence of the psychiatrists as providing a sufficient 
case that the negligence alleged did in fact cause the physical and psychological 
damage.
22
 May LJ held that cases which might be labelled as child abuse cases were 
not bound to fail as a class. May LJ determined that there may be circumstances in 
which a claim in common law negligence might be available to an individual who 
claims that he has been damaged as a result of the failure of the local authority to look 
after him. It would therefore be unlikely that local authorities could establish a 
defence that relied upon blanket immunity.  
Phelps, Barrett and S are illustrative of broader changes in the sphere of public 
authority liability. In these judgments the courts distinguished X v Bedfordshire in a 
way which comes close to suggesting that its effects should be confined to its own 
particular facts; for example much of the reasoning advanced by Lord Brown 
Wilkinson in X v Bedfordshire to justify holding that there was no duty of care has 
been called into question and serious doubt has been cast on the view that a local 
authority owes no duty of care to children when exercising their statutory powers and 
discretions. Effectively these cases restrict the effect of X v Bedfordshire to the core 
proposition that decisions by local authorities whether or not to take children into care 
are not reviewable by way of a claim in negligence. Thus children cannot sue a local 
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authority in relation to decisions taken prior to a child being taken into the care of the 
local authority.  
However even this core proposition of X v Bedfordshire has been challenged 
by the European Court of Human Rights. In England and Wales where children have 
suffered as a result of a local authority‟s failure to prevent their injuries, they could 
bring a complaint under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. In the next section I will examine a number of decisions 
by the European Court of Human Rights which found that the restrictive provisions of 
tort law in relation to child welfare and protection, as expressed by the House of 
Lords in X v Bedfordshire County Council, fell foul of the European Convention on 
Human Rights; and I will consider whether the introduction of the Human Rights Act 
1998 has affected the common law principles of the law of negligence. 
 
The influence of the European Court of Human Rights 
Z & Ors v UK [2002] 34 EHRR 30, [2001] 2 FLR 612 ECHR is the first case 
in which the European Convention has been held to impose a positive obligation on 
the state to take operational measures in order to protect children against abuse and 
neglect in the family. In Z & Ors v UK the applicants in X v Bedfordshire complained 
to the European Court of Human Rights that the local authority failed to protect them 
from inhuman and degrading treatment in circumstances where the local authority 
was aware of the serious neglect and abuse which the children suffered at home. They 
also complained of a lack of procedural safeguards, of a lack of access to court and of 
a lack of effective remedies in respect of their complaints. The European Court found 
 16 
that Article 3
23
 of the European Convention of Human Rights requires states, and 
therefore local authorities, to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within 
their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, 
including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals. In Z the European 
Court had no doubt that the neglect and abuse suffered by the four child applicants 
unequivocally reached the threshold of inhuman and degrading treatment. This 
treatment was brought to the local authority‟s attention in October 1987, it was under 
a statutory duty to protect the children and had a range of powers available to them, 
including removal from their home. The children were however only taken into 
emergency care at the insistence of the mother on 30 April 1992. The European Court 
acknowledged the difficult and sensitive decisions facing the local authority and the 
important countervailing principle of respecting and preserving family life. 
Nonetheless, the facts of the case left no doubt as to the failure of the system to 
protect these child applicants from serious, long-term neglect and abuse. Accordingly, 
there had been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
24
 
The applicants also complained that they had been denied access to court to 
determine their claims of negligence against the local authority, invoking Article 6 of 
the Convention. This Article gives everyone the right to have a claim relating to his or 
her civil rights brought before a court or tribunal.
25
 The applicants argued that the 
House of Lords had unequivocally rejected their claim on the basis that actions 
against the local authorities for decisions taken in relation to child protection were 
excluded and that the English court had given no consideration to the seriousness, 
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 17 
nature or degree of the negligence alleged or rights violated. However the European 
Court found there was no breach of Article 6, the European Court observed that the 
applicants were not prevented in any practical manner from bringing their claims 
before the domestic courts. Indeed, the case was litigated with vigour up to the House 
of Lords, the applicants being provided with legal aid for that purpose. To bring 
Article 6 into play the court held that it is not enough that the non-existence of a cause 
of action under domestic law may be described as having the same effect as an 
immunity, in the sense of not enabling the applicant to sue for a given category of 
harm.
26
 Moreover, the European Court argued that it could not be said that the House 
of Lords came to its conclusion without a careful balancing of the policy reasons for 
and against the imposition of liability on the local authority in the circumstances of 
the applicants‟ case. The Court concluded that the inability of the applicants to sue the 
local authority flowed not from an immunity but from the applicable principles 
governing the substantive right of action in domestic law. There was no restriction on 
access to court and the applicants‟ claims were properly and fairly examined in light 
of the applicable domestic legal principles concerning the tort of negligence. 
Accordingly, the European Court found that there had been no violation of 
Article 6 of the Convention. Yet the outcome of the domestic proceedings the 
applicants brought is that they, and any children with complaints such as theirs, 
cannot sue the local authority in negligence for compensation, however foreseeable 
and severe the harm suffered and however unreasonable the conduct of the local 
authority in failing to take steps to prevent that harm. In the European Court‟s view 
this is an issue under Article 13, not Article 6.
27
 In TP & KM v UK [2002] 34 EHRR 
2, [2001] 2 FLR 549 ECHR the European Court of Human Rights interpreted Article 
                                                 
26
 at para. 98 
27
 Article 13 provides the right to an effective remedy before a national authority where there has been 
a violation of a Convention right or freedom. 
 18 
13 of the Convention as guaranteeing a remedy to enforce the substance of the 
Convention rights and freedoms at the national level in whatever form they might 
happen to be secured in the domestic legal order.
28
 In Z v UK the European Court 
found that the applicants did not have available to them an appropriate means of 
obtaining a determination of their allegations that the local authority failed to protect 
them from inhuman and degrading treatment, nor did they have the possibility of 
obtaining an enforceable award of compensation for the damage suffered thereby. The 
European Court specified that administrative, or quasi-judicial, remedies such as the 
Ombudsman or the statutory complaints procedure were ineffective given the 
seriousness of the allegations. Thus while the failure of the law of tort to offer a 
remedy in damages was not a breach of the right to a fair hearing, under Article 6, the 
failure to offer any effective remedy for the breach of Convention rights was a breach 
of Article 13.
29
 
In X v Bedfordshire the House of Lords decided that as matter of public 
policy, local authorities should not be at risk of litigation where the local authority 
negligently failed to investigate allegations of sexual abuse because it owed the victim 
no duty of care. It is clear from the judgment in Z v UK that such a policy is 
incompatible with the European Convention. In Z v UK the European Court of Human 
Rights held that children are entitled to an effective remedy when their European 
Convention rights have been breached as a result of local authority negligence and 
that local authorities no longer enjoy immunity from suit in respect of their child care 
functions. In E v UK [2003] 1 FLR 348 (ECHR) and in DP & JC v UK [2003] 1 FLR 
50 (ECHR) the European Court of Human Rights reassured that in cases involving 
serious child abuse the state will only be held responsible where they were, or should 
                                                 
28
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29
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have been, aware of what was going on and taken steps to safeguard the applicants. A 
state will only come under a positive obligation to act when there is a real and 
immediate risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of which they knew or ought to 
have known of. Therefore in order to engage the responsibility of the state in child 
abuse cases there must be a failure by the state authority to take reasonably available 
measures which could have a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the 
harm. The positive requirements imposed by the Convention will be determined by 
the extent of the knowledge at the time rather than the extent of the actual harm as 
subsequently fully revealed. However it will be no answer to a claim under Article 3 
that the public authority was not aware of the ill-treatment where the circumstances 
are such as to suggest that an investigation should have been made or the situation 
should have been monitored.  
The European Court of Human Rights also ruled on the position of parents and 
carers who are falsely accused of abusing their children. In TP & KM v UK the 
applicant in M v Newham LBC complained to the European Court of Human Rights of 
the actions and procedures whereby the local authority removed the second applicant 
into care on the basis of careless assumption of fact. They also complained of a lack 
of procedural safeguards, a lack of access to the court and a lack of effective remedies 
in respect of their complaints. The European Court ruled that the local authority failed 
to respect the family life of the applicant and thus breached Article 8 of the 
Convention.
30
 Although Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the 
decision-making process involved in child protection cases must be fair and such as to 
afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by Article 8. The Court considered that 
                                                 
30
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the question whether or not to disclose the interview to the mother should have been 
decided promptly to allow the mother to answer the allegations against her. The local 
authority‟s failure to submit the issue to the court for determination deprived her of an 
adequate involvement in the decision-making process concerning the care of her 
daughter and thereby of the requisite protection of their interests. In TP &d KM the 
Court made it clear that the positive obligation on the state to protect the interests of 
the family requires that the relevant material should have been disclosed to the family 
even in the absence of any specific request for it. The European Court considered that 
in these circumstances the applicants right to family life had been breached and that 
accordingly they should have had available to them a means of claiming that the local 
authority‟s handling of the procedures was responsible for the damage which they 
suffered and obtaining compensation for that damage. Because they had not been 
afforded an effective remedy, there had also been a violation of Article 13 of the 
Convention.  
The Human Rights Act 1998 makes it unlawful for any public authority to act 
incompatibly with the European Convention of Human Rights. Local authorities must 
now ensure that their practices, policies, procedures and service delivery are 
consistent with Convention rights and the domestic courts are statutorily obliged to 
take into account the principles applied by the European Court of Human Rights. 
Therefore the Human Rights Act 1998 requires English courts to take these cases into 
account when dealing with an allegation of inaction or negligence on the part of a 
local authority. In Z v UK, TP and KM v UK, E v UK and DP & JC v UK the 
European Court rejected the Bedfordshire style blanket immunity for public 
authorities. Z, E and DP & JC v UK ruled that decisions whether or not to take a child 
into care no longer enjoyed immunity from suit. Where local authorities have failed in 
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their duty to act, or have acted negligently there must be available to the victims or 
their families a mechanism for establishing the liability of state bodies for acts or 
omissions involving a breach of their rights. The Human Rights Act statutorily 
obliges English courts to adopt a broader approach to the imposition of liability upon 
child welfare agencies. The Human Rights Act 1998 therefore brings the law into an 
area of child protection that was previously free from the possibility of liability and 
widens the opportunity to challenge the decisions of local authorities.
31
 Consequently 
it would seem that the children in X v Bedfordshire would have had an action under 
the Human Rights Act had it been in force.
32
 However the European Court of Human 
Rights did not hold that a general duty of care in negligence is owed, nor did the 
Court overrule the decisions of the House of Lords in X v Bedfordshire County 
Council and M v Newham. It is in this context that the English judiciary made their 
landmark judgment in D & Others v East Berkshire Community Health & Others and 
JD (FC) v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust and others. 
 
The post-Human Rights Act 1998 approach to local authority liability 
The process of „incremental demolition‟33 of local authority immunity has 
been accelerated by the Court of Appeal decision of D & Others v East Berkshire 
Community Health & Others [2003] EWCA Civ 1151 and the House of Lords 
judgment in JD (FC) v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust and others 
[2005] UKHL 23. D & Others v East Berkshire Community Health & Others 
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concerned three appeals involving accusations of abusing a child made against a 
parent by the professionals concerned for the welfare of that child. In each case the 
accusations proved to be unfounded and the parents claimed damages for psychiatric 
harm caused by the false accusations. Thus D & Others v East Berkshire Community 
Health & Others relates to a failure by the local authority to investigate alleged 
instances of child abuse properly, which contrasts with X v Bedfordshire where the 
local authority failed to investigate at all. In D & Others v East Berkshire Community 
Health & Others the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals by the parents. However 
in one case the child also claimed, the child was 9 years old at the time she was taken 
into care after a wrongful diagnosis of sexual abuse by her father. The Court of 
Appeal allowed the appeal by the child and held that X v Bedfordshire County Council 
was contrary to the Human Rights Act 1998 in relation to the position of the child. 
The court reasoned that where child abuse is suspected, section 1 of the Children Act 
1989 requires that the interests of the child are paramount. Local authorities are also 
obliged to respect a child‟s European Convention rights by virtue of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. Lord Phillips MR held that given these statutory obligations the 
recognition of a duty of care to the child should not have a significantly adverse effect 
on the manner in which local authorities perform their duties.
34
 Lord Phillips 
concluded that it would no longer be legitimate to rule that, as a matter of law, no 
common law duty of care was owed to a child in relation to the investigation of 
suspected child abuse and the initiation and pursuit of care proceedings. Whether the 
imposition of a duty of care was fair, just and reasonable had to be determined on the 
facts of each case. Whereas Barrett and Phelps restricted Bedfordshire to the core 
proposition that decisions by local authorities whether or not to take a child into care 
                                                 
34
 at para. 83 
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were not reviewable, the Court of Appeal in D held that this core proposition could 
not survive the Human Rights Act 1998. This view was upheld by the House of Lords 
in JD (FC) v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust and others. This case 
represents a swing away from X v Bedfordshire and Stovin v Wise towards more 
traditional negligence principles of foreseeability and proximity, children are now 
able to sue when negligence, causation and loss can be established. The public policy 
considerations which prevented the imposition of liability in X v Bedfordshire are no 
longer applicable. The law in England and Wales now mirrors that in New Zealand 
since AG v Prince and Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 and B and others v Attorney 
General of New Zealand [2003] UKPC 61, [2003] 4 All ER 833, in that child welfare 
agencies now owe children a duty of care to investigate allegations of abuse with a 
reasonable degree of care and skill. Child welfare agencies can now be successfully 
sued if they take a child into care who is not at risk of abuse (for violating Article 8 of 
the European Convention), or if they fail to take into care a child who is being abused 
(for violating Article 3 of the European Convention. However in D and JD the court 
held that no duty of care was owed to parents when investigating child abuse. 
In JD (FC) v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust and others the 
parents involved in D & Others v East Berkshire Community Health & Others 
claimed that the professionals responsible for protecting a suspected child abuse 
victim also owe a duty of care to any parent suspected of having committed a crime 
against their child; a duty sounding in damages if they act in good faith but carelessly. 
In a majority decision the House of Lords dismissed the parents’ appeal and upheld the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. For the House of Lords, the possible conflict between 
the interests of the child and their parent and the impact that imposing a duty in favour of 
the parent could have on the process of child protection proved determinative. The House 
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of Lords believed that a duty of care owed to parents would cut across the duty owed to 
the children, as social workers and doctors dealing with suspected child abuse cases 
would always have to take account of the risk that they might harm the parents. This 
approach would conflict with the need to put the interests of the child first in any case 
of suspected abuse. Placing children‟s interests at the centre of abuse investigations is 
a theme running through the guidance in Working Together
35
 which was issued under 
section 7 of the Local Government (Social Services) Act 1970. Doctors and social 
workers are specifically warned in the Guidance that the interests of parents and 
children may conflict and that in such cases the child‟s interests should be the 
priority.
36
 Guidance issued under the 1970 Local Government (Social Services) Act 
does not carry the same legal force as the Statute. Nonetheless local authorities are 
required to act in accordance with such guidance, which is intended to be a statement 
of what is held to be good practice and are likely to be quoted or used in court 
proceedings as well as in local authority policy and practice papers. Lord Nicholls 
believed that the seriousness of child abuse as a social problem demanded that social 
workers and doctors, acting in good faith in what they believed to be the child‟s best 
interests, should not be subject to potentially conflicting duties when deciding 
whether the child might have been abused (para 86). Lord Nicholls concluded that 
those investigating suspected child abuse “must be able to act single-mindedly in the 
interests of the child” free from any fears that they might be liable in negligence to the 
parent (para 85). If a social worker were required to owe a duty of care to a parent in 
situations such as this, which involved criminal offences, it would mean the social 
worker owed a duty of care to a suspect. 
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Also the House of Lords in JD (FC) v East Berkshire Community Health NHS 
Trust and others believed that if a duty of care were to be imposed in favour of the 
parents in these cases, it could then be argued that this duty should be extended to 
other members of the family, to friends of the family, to teachers and to child-
minders, in short, to anyone who might come under suspicion of having abused the 
child. The potentially wide range of this supposed additional duty could only increase 
the risk of compromising the key duty of care to the children. Accordingly the House 
of Lords held that the appropriate level of protection for a parent suspected of abusing 
their child is that all investigations must be conducted in good faith. This affords 
suspected parents a similar level of protection to that afforded generally to persons 
suspected of committing crimes.
37
 To hold otherwise would abandon the concept of 
duty of care as a universal prerequisite to liability in negligence and replace it with an 
adaptable standard of care which could be adjusted to accommodate the complexities 
arising in fields such as social workers or medical professionals dealing with children 
at risk of abuse. Lord Nicholls believed such a change would result in uncertainty in 
this area of law and would be unnecessary as the Human Rights Act already allows 
claims to be brought directly against public authorities in respect of breaches of 
European Convention rights.
38
 Lord Nicholls had previously made a similar judgment 
in the Privy Council in B and others v Attorney General of New Zealand [2003] 
UKPC 61, [2003] 4 All ER 833. This case concerned the alleged negligent 
investigation of a complaint that the father had sexually abused his daughters. The 
Privy Council allowed the appeal by the daughters but dismissed that of the father, 
holding that a duty was owed to them but not to him. In delivering the judgment of the 
Board, Lord Nicholls held that no common law duty of care was owed to the father as 
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he was the alleged perpetrator of the abuse. In an inquiry into an abuse allegation the 
interests of the alleged perpetrator and of the children as the alleged victims are poles 
apart. Likewise, Doyle CJ in the Australian case of Sullivan v Moody held that the 
parents of the child, or at least the parent who was suspected of sexual abuse, could 
hardly be regarded as a person whose interests they could be expected or required by 
law to consider (para 42). The Australian High Court concluded that the interests of 
the child were to be the paramount consideration. If the Department of Community 
Welfare or its officers owed a duty of care to an alleged abuser, this would discourage 
or inhibit the performance of their statutory child protection duties. 
Although local authorities and health professionals do not owe a duty of care 
to parents, it might be possible to scrutinise their actions by means of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. Removal of the child from its parents will undoubtedly constitute an 
interference with respect for family life in accordance with Article 8 of the European 
Convention. The issue then will be whether this was justified in accordance with 
article 8(2), which permits interference with the right as is in accordance with the law 
and is “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.” However in JD (FC) v East Berkshire Community Health NHS 
Trust the House of Lords held that interference with family life did not justify 
according a suspected parent a higher level of protection than other suspected 
perpetrators. Also where events predate the Human Rights Act it is clear that parents 
will have no cause of action. In such cases, although having no claim in negligence, 
parents might be able to argue breaches of relevant provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. TP & KM v UK promotes parents‟ involvement in the 
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decision making to include allowing parents an effective opportunity to address 
allegations, and, if necessary, to challenge them. However, the House of Lords has 
made clear that the interests of the child will be paramount. 
The effect of the judgments in JD (FC) v East Berkshire Community Health 
NHS Trust and others and D & Others v East Berkshire Community Health & Others 
is that when considering whether a suspicion of child abuse justifies proceedings for 
the removal of a child from the parents, a common law duty of care is owed to the 
child (but not to the parents); therefore providing a legal remedy to children who have 
been victims of negligence in relation to the investigation of abuse or the initiation of 
care proceedings. The policy reasons that previously led the House of Lords to hold 
that no duty of care towards a child exists now cease to apply, and failure to remove a 
child from the parents could give rise to a valid claim by a child as readily as a 
decision to remove the child. Thus the ruling in X v Bedfordshire will not stand in the 
way of a claim by the child against a local authority for negligence in the manner in 
which it contributed to the child protection investigation. 
Increased litigation involving cases of children wrongly diagnosed as suffering 
from child abuse or mistakenly taken into care is now a potential consequence. In 
such cases the policy reasons relied upon by the House of Lords in X v Bedfordshire 
will not be applicable. Local authorities who act according to accepted standards of 
practice and who make difficult judgments in good faith and to the best of their 
abilities will not be considered negligent. However when a local authority fails to 
follow the laws, rules, standards and procedures, children now have a right to hold the 
local authority accountable for this failure. It is hoped that holding professionals 
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accountable through the law will deter malpractice and improve the quality of child 
protective practice.
39
 
 
Conclusion  
Child protection work is undoubtedly a delicate and difficult task, nevertheless 
children have a right to a professional service. The United Nations Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has frequently recommended that in England and Wales children 
should have an effective remedy for violations of their rights.
40
 There is no obvious 
reason why public bodies charged with duties framed in objective terms should be 
provided with protection from challenge and given immunity from liability which is 
not afforded to others, merely because they are public bodies.
41
 The prospect of 
liability for negligence and breach of statutory duty could encourage local authorities 
to improve their performance not only in carrying out the legal duties owed to 
children in need, but also in respect of the overall management of the system.
42
 
Introducing liability would require practitioners to show that they took reasonable 
care and acted with an acceptable level of professional competence. Providing local 
authorities with immunity from action for damages creates the reverse situation. The 
courts should therefore seek to ensure that high standards of public service provision 
are maintained through the imposition of a duty of care.  
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